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Abstract
In September 2017, McAffee Labs quarterly report [1] estimated that brute force attacks represent 20% of total network
attacks, making them the most prevalent type of attack ex-aequo with browser based vulnerabilities. These attacks have sometimes
catastrophic consequences, and understanding their fundamental limits may play an important role in the risk assessment of
password-secured systems, and in the design of better security protocols. While some solutions exist to prevent online brute-force
attacks that arise from one single IP address, attacks performed by botnets are more challenging. In this paper, we analyze these
distributed attacks by using a simplified model. Our aim is to understand the impact of distribution and asynchronization on
the overall computational effort necessary to breach a system. Our result is based on Guesswork, a measure of the number of
password queries (guesses) before the correct one is found in an optimal attack, which is a direct surrogate for the time and
the computational effort. We model the lack of synchronization by a worst-case optimization in which the queries are received
in the worst possible order, resulting in a min-max formulation. We show that even without synchronization and for sequences
of growing length, the asymptotic optimal performance is achievable by using randomized guesses drawn from an appropriate
distribution. Therefore, randomization is key for distributed asynchronous attacks. In other words, asynchronous guessers can
asymptotically perform brute-force attacks as efficiently as synchronized guessers.
I. INTRODUCTION
From online banking [2] and bitcoin wallets [3], to secure shell (SSH), file transfer protocol(ftp), and telnet servers [4], and
passing by governmental institutions [5], brute-force attacks have shown to be one of the major threats to network security.
Despite the computational burden on the attacker, brute-force attacks are prevalent. This can be explained through multiple
points of view. First, passwords are often weaker than what they ought to be, meaning that attackers can hope to find the
correct password well before they query a significant portion of the possible password strings. Next, attacks through huge
networks of compromised computers (botnets) are now more common, giving access to significant computational resources for
the attacker. More critically, these botnets help to disguise the attack by distributing it. Indeed, a main solution to the threat of
online brute-force attacks is to setup a system that detects and prevents too many queries from any one user, as determined by
IP addresses. As such, an attacker which would use only a single IP address, would be limited to a fixed number of guesses. In
recent years however, this defense was circumvented by using massive botnets, each bot querying potential passwords. In this
situation, it is extremely hard to detect legitimate users in the crowd of illegitimate attackers. However, these attacks come with
a cost, namely, the attack is now distributed across thousands, if not millions of computers, each with limited computational
power and synchronization tools.
As a first step to understand the impact of synchronization, we put forth a simplified mathematical model for passwords and
brute-force attacks. We believe that the intuition gained from this model is informative and helpful in assessing the security of
systems against brute-force attacks. In particular, we study Guesswork, a measure of the number of password queries (guesses)
that an adversary would have to perform before finding the correct one. Guesswork is best explained through the following
simple game: Alice selects a secret discrete random variable X taking values in a finite set X , and distributed according
to PX . Then, Bob, who does not see the realization of X but does know PX , presents to Alice a successive sequence of
guesses Xˆ1, Xˆ2, and so on. For each guess Xˆi, Alice checks whether it is the correct symbol X . If the answer is affirmative,
Alice says “yes”, and the game ends. Otherwise, the game continues, and Alice examines subsequent guesses. This game has
a simple interpretation in the context of security. Consider a setup where a system is protected using a password X , that
Alice draws at random from a distribution PX (or drawn by nature and revealed to Alice, as it happens in several important
password-protection tools which generate passwords, e.g. iCloud keychain). An adversary, Bob, wishes to breach the system by
performing a brute-force attack, or, in other words, by guessing the password X . The brute-force attack on the system would
consist of, first, producing a list of all possible password strings X ordered from most, to least likely with respect to PX , and
then exhausting the list of passwords one by one until successfully guessing the correct password. In order to understand the
security of such a system under these attacks, it is necessary to evaluate the computational effort required by Bob to breach
the system. To achieve this, it is reasonable to quantify the number of queries before the correct password is found, which we
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Fig. 1: In a synchronized attack, the bots query from the password-list in a specified order. In the asynchronous attack, they
do not know the order in which the queries will be sent. Our solution will consist at drawing guesses according to some
distribution, instead of querying passwords one-by-one.
shall denote by G∗(X), and in particular, its ρ-th moment, i.e. E[G∗(X)ρ]. The number of queries is a direct surrogate for the
computational effort that Bob must accomplish, and the lower this quantity, the more vulnerable the system is to brute-force
attacks.
If multiple adversarial agents coordinate their attack on the secret string, the system will be compromised as soon as any of
them succeeds. Moreover, the individual computational effort of each adversary is reduced, while the total number of queries
remains the same. Indeed, an optimal strategy here would consist of having each agent query the most-likely password that
has not been queried by any of the other agents. Since this strategy reduces to querying as a group from the optimal list, the
average number of queries completed by each agent is thus reduced by a factor of the number of agents, with respect to the
case where a single agent queries alone. This requires the agents to be able to synchronize their queries, that is, there must be
a knowledge of an ordering in which the agents make guesses. However, in many practical scenarios the adversarial agents are
completely distributed and have limited communication with each other. One prime example is botnets, in which agents are
often oblivious to the actions taken by other agents, and may have limited access to shared memory or synchronization tools.
Owing to constraints of the physical computers in which these bots run, the speed, latency, and reliability of these agents is
heterogeneous — thus perfect synchronization is unlikely. Note that even if a central agent distributes lists of possible guesses
to the bots, such that the lists form a partition of all guesses, making sure no guess is repeated, the lack of synchronization
may still render the process sub-optimal. We illustrate an example of synchronized and asynchronous attack in Fig 1. At one
extreme, a complete lack of synchronization can be modeled by a worst-case optimization, in which the guesses of each agent
come in the worst possible order. The goal of this paper is to study how much the lack of synchronization, as described above,
is detrimental to the overall number of queries that are made until the game ends. We discuss why deterministic strategies
cannot perform well in this paradigm, while on the other hand, a simple randomized strategy in which all the guesses are drawn
i.i.d. from a certain distribution asymptotically achieves the same optimal performance of a synchronous attack when guessing
infinite sequences. This optimal guessing distribution is non-trivial, and, surprisingly it is not the original password generating
distribution PX . It is a tilted distribution from PX , where the tilt exponent depends on the moment of guesswork of interest.
In other words, distributed and asynchronous agents can adopt a strategy for which the asymptotic number of total queries
sent before a system breach is optimal, regardless of the ordering in which these queries are received, but this distribution is
only optimal for a given moment of guesswork, and not optimal universally across all moments.
For the sake of simplicity, we have made the following assumptions on the password generation process, as well as on the
brute-force attack itself.
1) Password are assumed to be of a fixed length n. Note that in some applications, the brute-force attack takes place on
private key of some fixed size, in which case the length of the secret key is often known.
2) Passwords are assumed to be generated i.i.d. from a distribution PX .1
3) The goals of the adversaries is to guess one given password. In practice, there might be multiple accounts which undergo
attacks simultaneously.
4) The adversaries have no additional information about the users and make their guessing based solely on PX .
We believe that some of these assumptions could be relaxed and generalized using techniques from the literature, as discussed
below. Despite these assumptions, the insights gained from the model we study shed light on the robustness of brute-force
attacks to asynchronization. To illustrate this claim, we have shown our results on an extract of the Adobe Leaked password
dataset (see [6] for a description of the dataset). In particular, we extracted the 104 most likely passwords from a subset of 10
1We briefly mention generalizations to passwords generated according to an irreducible stationary Markov Chain in Remark 1 in Section III.
3(a) Probability of finding the password in fewer than i queries.
In a synchronized attack, the passwords has to be found after at
most |X | = 1e4 queries. The blue and orange line correspond
to i.i.d. guesses according to the distribution Pˆ .
(b) Log-probability mass function. Notice how the tilted distri-
bution gives more weight to less likely symbols, as they cor-
respond to the symbol which are the most costly for password
guessing.
Fig. 2: Experiments on a subset of Adobe Leak password data (only 104 unique passwords kept). Despite the heavy tail of
the distribution, a randomized strategy with some tilt improves the log expected number of guesses from 9.2 when using the
naive distribution, to 8.8 when using the optimal tilt
millions passwords in the data, and restricted our study to those passwords. We investigate the guesswork when the correct
password is drawn according to the distribution PX as computed on this restricted sample of the data. We show in Figure 2
the performance of a randomized strategy when using the optimal guessing distribution versus the naive distribution PX , both
in terms of expected number of guesses and in terms of probability of making less than a fixed number of guesses. Note that
the true distribution PX performs well if one wish to make only a limited number of guesses, but eventually takes longer to
reach a high probability. This is due to less frequent passwords, which are barely ever queried if guesses are drawn according
to PX . The optimal distribution attributes more weight to these less likely symbols.
Related Work: The problem of a cipher with a guessing wiretapper was considered in [7]. The problem of guessing subject
to distortion and constrained Shannon entropy were investigated in [8] and [9], respectively. The above results have been
generalized to ergodic Markov chains [10] and a wide range of stationary sources [11]. The problem of guessing under source
uncertainty was investigated in [12]. The analysis of the guessing exponents, using large deviations theory, was considered
in [13]. In [14] it was shown that the guesswork satisfies a large deviation property and the rate function was characterized.
They also provided an approximation to the distribution of guesswork using the large deviation property. Guesswork under
erasures was studied in [15]. A brute-force attack where adversaries are interested in multiple passwords is discussed in [16]. A
distributed attack model based on password hints was proposed in [17] and evaluated under guesswork metrics, and a wiretap
system under guessing guarantees was studied in [18]. Finally, a geometric characterization of the guesswork was established
in [19] and expanded in [20].
Main Contributions: We define a min-max formulation that models a worst case asynchronous attack, and show that a
randomized strategy in which each guess is drawn i.i.d. from a certain distribution achieves the same asymptotic performance
as an optimal synchronized attack. This optimal distribution is non-trivial; performing guesses according to the distribution
from which the password was generated yields a strategy that is exponentially worse than the optimal distribution. In fact,
the optimal choice is a tilted distribution, where the tilt parameter is chosen depending on the moment of guesswork which
is optimized. We also discuss optimal strategies when the benchmark is to maximize the probability of success of an attack
with a fixed number of overall queries, and show that an i.i.d. guessing strategy has again optimal performance asymptotically.
The optimal distribution is again a tilted distribution, where the tilt depends on the number of queries allowed. Together these
results indicate that there is no loss in performance (asymptotically) when performing an asynchronous attack.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we establish some notation and provide a brief background on the guessing
problem. We discuss the impact of synchronization under the number of guesses in Section III and then under the probability
of a system breach with a fixed number of queries in Section IV.
II. NOTATION AND BACKGROUND
Throughout this paper, scalar random variables (RVs) will be denoted by capital letters, their sample values will be denoted
by the respective lower case letters, and their alphabets will be denoted by the respective calligraphic letters, e.g. X , x, and
X , respectively. We also use the notation Xn to designate the sequence of RVs (X1, . . . , Xn), and may drop the subscript
4when the size of the sequence considered is clear from the context, e.g., X. The set of all n-vectors with components taking
values in a certain finite alphabet, will be denoted by the same alphabet superscripted by n, e.g., Xn. Probability distributions
will be denoted by the letters P and Q, with subscripts that denote the names of the random variables involved along with
their conditioning, if applicable, following the customary notation rules in probability theory. For example, QXY stands for a
generic joint distribution {QXY (x, y), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y}, PY |X denotes the matrix of single-letter transition probabilities, and
so on.
The expectation operator will be denoted by E {·}, and when we wish to make the dependence on the underlying distribution
Q clear, we denote it by EQ {·}. The Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence between two probability measures P and Q will be
denoted by D(P ||Q). For entropies, it will be convenient to write explicitly the distributions, e.g. H(PX). When dealing with
binary random variables we may use the short-hand notation H(p), where it is understood that it refers to the Shannon entropy
over a Bernouilli distribution parametrized by p. A similar notation will be used for divergences, e.g., D(p1‖p2).
For a given vector xn, let Pˆxn denote the empirical distribution, that is, the vector {Pˆxn(x), x ∈ X}, where Pˆxn(x) is the
relative frequency of the letter x in xn. Let T (PX) denote the type class associated with PX , that is, the set of all sequences
xn for which Pˆxn = PX .
The cardinality of a finite set A will be denoted by |A|, its complement will be denoted by Ac. The probability of an event
E will be denoted by Pr {E}. For two sequences of positive numbers, {an} and {bn}, the notation an .= bn means that {an}
and {bn} are of the same exponential order, i.e., n−1 log an/bn → 0 as n→∞, where logarithms are defined with respect to
(w.r.t.) the natural basis, that is, log (·) = ln(·). Finally, for a real number x, we denote [x]+ , max{0, x}.
Guessing Functions and Strategies: A (possibly randomized) guessing strategy is a sequence Xˆ∞1 , {Xˆk(PX) : k ≥ 1},
where Xˆk(PX) ∈ X , is independent of the realization X but may depend on PX . In other words, Xˆ∞1 is the list of guesses
the attacker will use one after the other when trying to guess X . The corresponding guessing function, G(X, Xˆ∞1 ), defined as
G(X, Xˆ∞1 ) , inf
{
k ≥ 1 : Xˆk(PX) = X
}
, (1)
represents the number of queries before reaching X . The ρ-th moment of the number of guesses is thus given by E[G(X, Xˆ∞1 )ρ],
where the expectation is taken over the distribution PX and the randomness inherent in the guessing strategy Xˆ∞1 . The ρ-th
moment guesswork of a source X ∼ PX is given by
min
Xˆ∞1
E
[
G(X, Xˆ∞1 )
ρ
]
, (2)
where the minimization is over all guessing strategies. In particular, the first moment, i.e. ρ = 1, corresponds to the average
number of guesses that an adversary would have to perform before guessing the correct X .2 It was shown in [21] that, without
any constraint on the set of possible guessing strategies, the optimal guessing strategy is obtained by ordering the symbols in
X by decreasing order of PX -probabilities, with ties broken arbitrarily, resulting in a deterministic strategy {xˆk(PX) : k ≥ 1}.
The resulting guessing function, denoted by G∗(X), represents the position of X in the optimal list, i.e. the list of symbols
ordered from most likely to least likely. 3 The problem of bounding the expected number of guesses was investigated in [22].
Specifically, among other things, it was shown that for any ρ ≥ 0, and any guessing function G(·),
E [G(X)ρ] ≥ (1 + log |X |)−ρ
[∑
x∈X
PX(x)
1
1+ρ
]1+ρ
. (3)
On the contrary, the optimal guessing function, satisfies4
E [G∗(X)ρ] ≤
[∑
x∈X
PX(x)
1
1+ρ
]1+ρ
. (4)
Finally, letting X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) be a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables over
a finite set, and letting G∗(X) denote the optimal guessing function of a realization of X, it was shown that [22, Proposition
5]
Eρ(PX) , lim
n→∞
1
n
logE [G∗(X)ρ] = ρ ·H 1
1+ρ
(X1), (5)
where Hα(X) is the Re´nyi entropy of order α (α > 0, α 6= 1), defined as
Hα(X) ,
1
1− α log
[∑
x∈X
PX(x)
α
]
. (6)
2Although the most relevant moment to consider for practical purposes is the expectation, i.e. ρ = 1, we consider here a more general quantity as to be
consistent with existing literature on guesswork.
3Note that the optimal strategy G∗(X) is deterministic, therefore the dependence on Xˆ∞1 is dropped in the notation.
4An improved bound by a factor of 2 was reported in [23].
5Note that the function Eρ(PX) simply quantifies the exponential growth of the guesswork, as n→∞. We note that (5) gives
an asymptotic operational characterization/meaning to Re´nyi entropy of order 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
III. ASYNCHRONOUS BRUTE-FORCE ATTACK
In this section, we discuss synchronization when multiple agents aim to breach a secured system. Recall that we say that
distributed agents are synchronized if they know in which order every agent’s queries will be received by Alice. In this case,
they can query from the optimal list as a group, i.e., the first query received is the most likely symbol, etc. In other words,
full synchronization means they can all share a single (optimal) list, and a pointer to this list advancing after each new guess.
As a result, the total number of queries sent is the same as the optimal single agent guesswork, namely, (5) is achieved, while
the individual computational burden on each agent is reduced since the queries are divided among agents. Further, even if the
number of adversaries grows exponentially5 with the length of the password n, the total number of queries remains the same.
Instead, if agents do not know in which order the queries are delivered, they must adopt a strategy which performs well
under any such ordering. In particular, we shall adopt a worst-case approach in which the goal is to minimize the number
of queries in the worst ordering. Specifically, let X, an i.i.d. sequence of length n generated from PX , be the sequence to
be guessed, and let {Xˆ(t)k : k ≥ 1} be the strategy of agent t ∈ T , where T is possibly an infinite countable set. Again, we
shall be interested in the regime where |T | grows at least exponentially fast with n, and the goal is to characterize number
of queries made in total. We let the permutation pi : N+ → T × N+ denote the ordering in which the queries are received,
i.e., pi(i) = (ti, ki) means that the i-th query received is Xˆ
(ti)
ki
. Denote by Π the set of all such possible orderings. Under an
ordering pi, Alice receives the sequence of queries pi(Xˆ∞1 ) , {Xˆ(ti)ki : i ≥ 1}. Note that this permutation allows reordering of
guesses of a given agent t ∈ T which may be received in any arbitrary order. For some fixed strategies {Xˆ(t)k : k ≥ 1}, the
worst ordering in terms of guesswork is thus given by
sup
pi∈Π
E
{
G(X, pi(Xˆ∞1 ))
ρ
}
. (7)
The goal of the agents is to minimize the worst-case number of queries, or, in other words, solve the min-max problem
inf
{Xˆ(t)k ,k≥1} for t∈T
sup
pi∈Π
E
{
G(X, pi(Xˆ∞1 ))
ρ
}
. (8)
The main result of this section, presented below, characterizes the asymptotic exponent of (8), as n → ∞. The proof of this
result, along with the associated lemmas, are given after some discussion.
Theorem 1 For X an i.i.d. sequence according to PX , and {Xˆ(t)k , k ≥ 1} sequences of guesses which are independent over
t ∈ T , we have the following
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
(
inf
{Xˆ(t)k :k≥1}
sup
pi∈Π
E
{
G(X, pi(Xˆ∞1 ))
ρ
})
= lim
n→∞
1
n
logE {G∗(X)ρ}
= ρ ·H 1
1+ρ
(X). (9)
Note that guesswork measures the total number of guesses made by the agents. Thus it is clear that with full synchronization
between the agents this value will not depend on |T |. In a sense, dependence on |T | for a certain scheme would indicate a
lack of synchronization, as it would suggest that queries are repeated by the agents. Surprisingly, Theorem 1 states that even
under a worst-case assumption, there exist a strategy under which the guesswork does not depend on |T | and is similar to the
fully synchronous case. The above result and (5) show that synchronization is not necessary to achieve the asymptotic optimal
performance. This can be equivalently formulated by an achievability strategy, and a converse. The converse result is trivial,
as the performance of the synchronized strategy E {G∗(X)} upper bounds (8).
Lemma 1 (Converse) For any strategy Xˆ∞,
inf
{Xˆ(t)k ,k≥1} for t∈T
sup
pi∈Π
E
{
G(X, pi(Xˆ∞1 ))
ρ
}
≥ E {G∗(X)} . (10)
We now turn to finding an appropriate strategy which would match this converse bound. Let us first examine a naive solution
to this problem. Consider the strategy which consists in letting each agent construct the optimal list and query it individually,
5Note that in practice, the number of agents usually needs to grow since most secured systems include a mechanism which blocks IP addresses after a
given number of password attempts. Thus, if a single agent can only make k queries, there must be at least d|X |n/ke agents to guarantee that a password
of length n will be found.
6that is X(t)1 is the most likely symbol for all t ∈ T , X(t)2 the second most likely symbol, etc. It is easy to see that (7) would
evaluate to a quantity which grows with the number of agents |T |. Indeed, many queries are duplicated, and thus the overall
number of queries grows with |T |, without even reducing the computational burden on each adversary since they all must query
the same password strings. Note that this remains true if one considers a less stringent worst-case analysis, by for example,
letting the guesses of each of the agent to be consistent among themselves, i.e. the permutation does not change the relative
order of the guesses of each agent.
If instead the agents agree on a partition of the guesses before the attack, in a way such that no two guesses are repeated,
then the correct password is queried by one unique agent. Again, it is easy to see that the worst-case analysis yields a quantity
which grows with |T |, even though it cannot grow beyond |X |n, as every unique password is queried at most once. In particular,
if |T | = |X |n, then the worst-case analysis achieves its upper-bound. Note that these observations are not only an artifact of
the worst-case analysis, but rather a consequence of the deterministic nature of the queries.
This motivates us to study randomized strategies. In particular, we consider guesses, which are randomly and independently
drawn according to a specific distribution, independent from each other, and identically distributed. We then study this optimal
distribution in terms of the expected moments of guesswork. Consider first a scalar X ∈ X , generated from PX . We let
{Xˆ(t)k , k ≥ 1} be an i.i.d. process with respect to Pˆ (·), for all t ∈ T . For a given ρ > 0, we define the quantity
Vρ(X, Xˆ
∞
1 ) ,
(
G(X, Xˆ∞1 ) + ρ− 1
ρ
)
, (11)
where
(
x
y
)
is the generalized binomial coefficient defined in terms of the Gamma function Γ(·), i.e.(
x
y
)
=
Γ(x+ 1)
Γ(y + 1)Γ(x− y + 1) . (12)
In particular, V1(X, Xˆ∞1 ) = G(X,X
∞
1 ). The motivation for this definition of Vρ(X, Xˆ
∞
1 ) will be made clear in the proof of
Lemma 2, where it allows us to compute a particular infinite sum neatly. Note that for large G(X, Xˆ∞1 ) and fixed integer
ρ, Stirling’s approximation of the binomial coefficient directly gives Vρ(X, Xˆ∞1 ) ≈ G(X, Xˆ∞1 )ρ/ρ!, therefore Vρ(X, Xˆ∞1 )
approximates the behavior of the guesswork moment G(X, Xˆ∞1 )
ρ, up to some factor. We are interested in the following
optimization problem
E{V ∗ρ (X, Xˆ∞1 )} , inf
Pˆ∈P
E{Vρ(X, Xˆ∞1 )}, (13)
where P is the probability simplex and {Xˆk : k ≥ 1} is generated i.i.d. from Pˆ . We let Pˆ ∗ρ designate the minimizer. The
following Lemma is the main ingredient in proving an achievability and thus Theorem 1.
Lemma 2 For any integer ρ ≥ 1,
logE{V ∗ρ (X, Xˆ∞1 )} = ρ ·H 11+ρ (X), (14)
and for any x ∈ X ,
Pˆ ∗ρ (x) =
PX(x)
1
1+ρ∑
x′∈X PX(x′)
1
1+ρ
. (15)
Before providing the proof of Lemma 2 we briefly discuss our result. First, we note that contrary to (5), the above result
provides an exact operational meaning for Re´nyi entropy Hα(X) of order α > 0. It should be mentioned here that a similar
interpretation for H1/2(X) was reported in [24, 25]. Also, we see that the optimal guessing distribution (15) is simply the tilted
distribution of PX of order 1/(1 + ρ). It should be emphasized that, since the function f(x) = x1/1+ρ is monotone, creating
an optimal list according to PˆX yields the exact same list as if done according to PX . However, the list of guesses chosen
i.i.d. according to PˆX will be different from the one if guesses are made i.i.d. according to PX . Indeed, letting Pˆ (x) = PX(x)
gives
logE{G(X, Xˆ∞1 )} = log |X | ,
which could be much worse than logE{V ∗1 (X, Xˆ∞1 )} = H1/2(X). Namely, when one is allowed only to guess passwordds
according to a certain distribution, independently, and without a list, then using the original distribution is strictly sub-optimal,
and the tilted distribution should be used. This result is related to similar results from the source-coding literature in which
a tilted distribution also appears as the solution of an optimization where longer codewords are penalized exponentially (see
e.g. [26, 27]). Finally, note that the result is not asymptotic. In particular, the randomized strategy can be used over an
alphabet X where each x ∈ X corresponds to a password. This result is thus relevant to dictionary attacks, where queries are
drawn according to a dictionary of possible passwords, and suggests that distributed dictionary attacks should use a guessing
distribution which is a tilted version of the true distribution.
7Proof 1 (Proof of Lemma 2) First, note that given X , G(X, Xˆ∞1 ) is a geometric random variable, and for k ≥ 1,
Pr{G(X, Xˆ∞1 ) = k} =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)(1− Pˆ (x))k−1Pˆ (x).
Then, for any ρ > 0, we have
E{Vρ(X, Xˆ∞1 )} =
∞∑
m=1
(
m+ ρ− 1
m− 1
)
Pr{G(X, Xˆ∞1 ) = m}
=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)Pˆ (x)
∞∑
m=1
(
m+ ρ− 1
m− 1
)
(1− Pˆ (x))m−1.
In the following, we calculate the second summation term in the r.h.s. of the last equality. This is equivalent to calculating
∞∑
m=1
(
m+ ρ− 1
ρ
)
ym−1.
Note that, using the identity Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x) recursively, we get that
Γ(m+ ρ)
Γ(ρ+ 1)
= (m+ ρ− 1) · (m+ ρ− 2) · · · (ρ+ 1)
= (−1)m−1(−ρ− 1) · (−ρ− 2) · · · (−ρ−m+ 1)
= (−1)m−1 Γ(−ρ)
Γ(−ρ−m+ 1) , (16)
which yields
(
m+ρ−1
ρ
)
= (−1)m−1(−ρ−1m−1 ), and together with the change of variable k = m− 1 we obtain
∞∑
m=1
(
m+ ρ− 1
m− 1
)
ym−1 =
∞∑
k=0
(−ρ− 1
k
)
(−y)k (17)
= (1− y)−ρ−1, (18)
where the last equality follows from the binomial formula. Thus,
E{Vρ(X, Xˆ∞1 )} =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)Pˆ (x)
1
Pˆ (x)1+ρ
=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
Pˆ (x)ρ
. (19)
Next, we minimize the last expression with respect to Pˆ ∈ P . To this end, since (19) is convex in Pˆ , Pˆ ∗ is given by the
solution of (for x ∈ X )
−ρ · PX(x)
Pˆ ∗(x)ρ+1
+ λ = 0,
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier, and thus,
Pˆ ∗(x) =
PX(x)
1
1+ρ∑
x′∈X PX(x′)
1
1+ρ
.
On substituting this optimal distribution in (19) we finally get
E{V ∗ρ (X, Xˆ∞1 )} =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
Pˆ ∗(x)ρ
=
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
,
as claimed.
The previous lemma applies to a scalar RV X , but can be easily extended to sequences Xn, as shown in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 Let X be a sequence of length n generated i.i.d. from PX . Then, we have,
lim
n→∞
1
n
logE{V ∗ρ (X, Xˆ∞1 )} = ρ ·H 11+ρ (X). (20)
8Proof 2 Treating X as a random vector, a direct application of Lemma 2 yields
logE{V ∗ρ (X, Xˆ∞1 )} = ρ ·H 11+ρ (X)
=
( ∑
x∈Xn
PX(x)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
.
The desired result follows by the additivity of the Re´nyi entropy.
Note that whenX is generated i.i.d., tilting the marginal distributions and drawing symbols i.i.d., or tilting the entire product
distribution result in the same optimal distribution.
Remark 1 We note that the result above can be generalized to passwords X which are generated according to an irreducible
stationary Markov Chain. More precisely, let U = (Uab) and γa, for a, b ∈ X , be the stochastic matrix and stationary distribution
of the Markov chain, respectively, so that
Pr {X = (x1 . . . xn)} = γx1
n−1∏
i=1
Uxixi+1 (21)
Then, it was shown in [10] that
lim
n→∞ logE {G
∗(X)ρ} = 1
1 + ρ
log λ, (22)
where λ is the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of the matrix with entries V = (U1/1+ρab ) for a, b ∈ X . Further, let {va} and {wa}
be the left and right eigenvectors of V associated with λ, that is∑
a∈X
va = 1,
∑
a∈X
vaVab = λvb,
∑
b∈X
wbVab = λwa. (23)
Analogously to the result of Corollary 1, it can be shown that generating guesses Xˆ according to a Markov Chain with entries
Vabwb/(λwa) achieves the asymptotic performance in (21). A proof of this fact is outside the scope of this paper, but follows
from steps outlined in [10] along with the proof of Lemma 2.
Remark 2 In the standard guessing problem [22] Alice tries to guess X using her knowledge of PX . It is assumed that there
are no constraints on the memory of Alice, namely, for each new guess, Alice knows her previous guesses, and thus she can
adapt her new guess accordingly (i.e., she will not guess again a previous incorrect guess). The setting we consider here is
equivalent to one in which Alice cannot keep track of her guesses, but still knows the distribution PX . It should be clear that in
this case all that Alice can do is to present a sequence of i.i.d. guesses Xˆ1, Xˆ2, . . ., drawn from some distribution Pˆ (·), which
shall be optimized in some sense. Lemma 2 can be equivalently interpreted as the performance of a memoryless attacker [24,
25, 28].
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof 3 (Proof of Theorem 1) We start by noting that letting {Xˆ(t)k : k ≥ 1} be an i.i.d. process distributed according to Pˆ ∗
(as defined in Lemma 2) gives an upper bound on (8). We prove that two bounds match asymptotically, by showing that the
exponent of the upper-bound is equal to ρ ·H1/ρ+1(X). Indeed, let {X(t)k : k ≥ 1} be an i.i.d. process distributed according
to Pˆ ∗ for all t ∈ T . Then, it is evident that pi(Xˆ∞1 ) is also an i.i.d. process distributed according to Pˆ ∗, for any permutation
pi ∈ Π. An application of Corollary 1 concludes the proof.
Note that the optimal distribution from Lemma 2 depends on the moment ρ. Indeed, the larger ρ, the more we are penalized
for passwords which are less frequent (which increase the work significantly). Therefore, the optimal strategy gives extra
weight to less frequent symbols as to make sure that they are more likely to be chosen than what their probability suggests.
We do so by raising PX to a power 1/1 + ρ. Nevertheless, the optimal distribution, and thus guessing strategy, will change
as a function of the guesswork moment ρ of interest. This contrasts with the synchronous case, in which the optimal strategy
consisting of querying the sequences from most likely to least likely is optimal universally for all moments ρ. This loss of
universality can be quantified in the following corollary, which characterizes the loss in using a distribution optimized for a
moment ρ > 0, when measured in terms of a moment γ 6= ρ, and is illustrated for a binary source in Figure 3.
Corollary 2 Let {Xˆk : k ≥ 1} be an i.i.d. process generated according to Pˆ ∗γ (x). Then:
logE{Vρ(X, Xˆ∞1 )} =
ρ
1 + γ
H γ−ρ+1
1+γ
(X) +
γ · ρ
1 + γ
H 1
1+γ
(X) (24)
9Fig. 3: This plots compares the performance of the randomized strategy as a function of the moment ρ. We compare the
optimal strategy which depends on ρ, against a fixed tilted distribution (γ = 1 in Corollary 2), when X ∼ Ber(1/5).
Proof 4 The proof follows by plugging Pˆ (·) = Pˆ ∗γ (·) into (19).
Lemma 2 can also be easily generalized to the case of availability of some side information Y which is correlated with
X . That is, (X,Y ) is now a pair of random variables with joint distribution PXY . Then, assume that the guesser generates
a sequence of guesses Xˆ1, Xˆ2, . . . which are i.i.d. given Y , and distributed according to PˆX|Y (·|·). As before, we define
G(X, Xˆ∞1 |Y ) , inf{k ≥ 1 : Xˆk(Y ) = X}. Then, following the proof of Theorem 2 we can show that the optimal guessing
distribution is
Pˆ ∗X|Y (x|y) =
PX|Y (x|y)
1
1+ρ∑
x′∈X PX|Y (x′|y)
1
1+ρ
(25)
for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , and
logE{V ∗ρ (X, Xˆ∞1 |Y )} = ρ ·H 11+ρ (X|Y ), (26)
where Hα(X|Y ) is the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order α, and V ∗ρ (X, Xˆ∞1 |Y ) is defined as in (13) but with G(X, Xˆ∞1 )
replaced by G(X, Xˆ∞1 |Y ).
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON THE NUMBER OF GUESSES
In Section III, we considered the case in which guesses are made until the correct sequence is found. In this section, we
consider the case where adversaries can use only a fixed number of guesses. More precisely, we focus on the scenario of
guessing n-length i.i.d. sequences, and we assume the adversaries make J = dXnαe total guesses. We analyze the success
probability in guessing the correct sequence and derive expressions which are exponentially tight as a function of n. We
consider both the synchronized case [22] as well as the asynchronous case.
We start with synchronized guessers. Let L designate the set consisting of the J most likely sequences according to PX(·).
The probability of success associated with the optimal guessing strategy is given by
Psynchrc,J =
∑
x∈L
PX(x).
Also, we define the exponential rate of Psynchrc,J as
Esynchrc,α , lim inf
n→∞ −
1
n
log Psynchrc,J . (27)
The following result is an immediate application of the large deviation principle of Guesswork, shown in [14].
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Theorem 2 ([14]) For any α ∈ [0, 1],
Esynchrc,α = min
QX∈Q(α)
D(QX‖PX), (28)
where Q(α) is defined as:
Q(α) = {QX : D(QX‖PX) +H(QX) < D(Q∗X‖PX) +H(Q∗X)} , (29)
with Q∗X being the solution of the optimization problem:
minimize
QX
D(QX‖PX) +H(QX)
subject to H(QX) ≥ α
(30)
In particular, if α > H(PX), then E
synchr
c,α = 0.
Note that the average number of guesses, roughly 2nH1/2(X), is much larger than the required list size that drives Psynchrc,J to
one (exponentially). This great difference comes from the way atypical events are treated in each optimization. In the case of
guesswork, an exponential price is payed for atypical events, since the number of queries will be exponential. For probability
of error however, the scenario is closer to regular source coding in which the impact of atypical events is sub-exponential,
meaning that the optimized quantity will necessarily be related to the typical events. Consider now the asynchronous case, and
let {Xˆk : k ≥ 1} be once again i.i.d. with distribution PXˆ . In this case the probability of success is defined as
Pasynchrc,J , Pr
{
G(X, Xˆ∞1 ) ≤ J
}
. (31)
One can verify that
Pasynchrc,J =
∑
x∈Xn
PX(x)
[
1− (1− PXˆ(x))J
]
.
Finally we define
Easynchrc,α , lim inf
n→∞ −
1
n
log Pasynchrc,J . (32)
While, in principle, the distribution PXˆ can be optimized to maximize the probability of success, we will assume that this
distribution is simply given by the tilted distribution of PX, namely, for some β ≥ 0, and any x ∈ Xn,
P
(β)
Xˆ
(x) , PX(x)
β∑
x∈X PX(x)β
. (33)
We motivate this choice by the results of the previous sub-section, which showed that these tilted distributions were optimal
in terms of the number of guesses. We have the following result.
Theorem 3 For any α, β ≥ 0,
Easynchrc,α (β) = min
QX∈Q(α)
{
D(QX ||PX) +
[
D(QX ||P (β)Xˆ ) +H(QX)− α
]
+
}
, (34)
where [x]+ , max{x, 0}.
Using Theorem 3, we obtain the following immediate result.
Corollary 3
min
β≥0
Easynchrc,α = min
QX∈Q(α)
D(QX‖PX) (35)
= Esynchrc,α . (36)
Corollary 3 essentially proves that the tilted family is asymptotically optimal, and that there exist a unique optimal tilt β for
each size list J = dXnαe.
Proof 5 (Proof of Corollary 3) By definition, minβ≥0E
asynchr
c,α ≥ 0. Then, for α ≥ H(PX), we see from Theorem 3 that by
taking QX = PX and β = 1, we have
min
β≥0
Easynchrc,α ≤ [H(PX)− α]+ = 0. (37)
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For α < H(PX), we first note that by definition minβ≥0E
asynchr
c,α ≥ Esynchrc,α . Hence, due to Theorem 2 and Lemma 3 in the
appendix we may conclude that
min
β≥0
Easynchrc,α ≥ D(Q∗X‖PX), (38)
where Q∗X is the solution of the optimization
minimize
QX
D(QX‖PX) +H(QX)
subject to H(QX) ≥ α.
(39)
On the other hand, by taking QX = Q∗X , we have
min
β≥0
Easynchrc,α ≤ D(Q∗X‖PX) + min
β≥0
[
D(Q∗X ||P (β)Xˆ )
]
+
.
It is a simple exercise to verify that Q∗X is a tilted distribution, i.e. there exist a β˜ such that Q
∗(x) = QX(x)
β˜∑
x′ QX(x′)β˜
. Letting
β = β˜ gives
min
β≥0
Easynchrc,α ≤ D(Q∗X ||PX). (40)
The result follows from combining (38) and (40).
We next provide the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Proof 6 (Proof of Theorem 3) For simplicity of presentation, we prove the theorem for binary sequences, i.e. X = {0, 1}, and
assume that 1/2 ≥ p , PX(0). For any given sequence xn ∈ Xn,
1
n
log PˆXn(x
n) = −D(Pˆxn ||p¯β)−H(Pˆxn) (41)
where Pˆxn is the empirical measure of a given sequence x
n, and p¯β = p
β
pβ+(1−p)β . Then,
Pasynchrc,J =
∑
xn∈Xn
PXn(x
n)
[
1− (1− Pˆxn)J
]
=
∑
xn∈Xn
2−n(D(Pˆxn ||p)+H(Pˆxn ))
×
[
1− (1− 2−n(D(Pˆxn ||p¯β)+H(Pˆxn )))J
]
.
Letting Qn denote the set of possible types, i.e. Qn , {0, 1/n, 2/n, . . . , n/n} we obtain,
Pasynchrc,J =
∑
q∈Qn,n
|T (q)| 2−n(D(q||p)+H(q))
×
[
1− (1− 2−n(D(q||p¯β)+H(q)))J
]
.
=
∑
q∈Qn,n
2nH(q)2−n(D(q||p)+H(q))2−n[D(q||p¯
β)+H(q)−α]
+
.
= max
q∈[0,1]
2
−n
[
D(q||p)+[D(q||p¯β)+H(q)−α]
+
]
where the fourth equation follows from the fact that (see, e.g., [29, Lemma 1]) if a ∈ [0, 1], then 12 min {1, aM} ≤ 1− (1−
a)M ≤ min {1, aM}. Thus, we have shown that
Easynchrc,α = min
q∈[0,1]
{
D(q||p) + [D(q||p¯β) +H(q)− α]
+
}
.
Together, Lemma 2 and Corollary 3 imply that i.i.d. guesses can perform optimally, both in terms of the expected number of
guesses, and in terms of the probability of success. Note that, analogous to Lemma 2, the optimal distribution in Corollary 3
depends on the parameter α. As a result, asynchronous guessers can perform brute-force attacks as efficiently as synchronized
guessers asymptotically, at the expense of universality.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the impact of synchronization on brute-force attacks. We showed that despite a lack of
synchronization, and considering a worst-case ordering of the guesses, a randomized guessing strategy allows to achieve the
optimal asymptotic performance, both in terms of average number of guesses, and in terms of probability of success after a
given number of steps. As such, a solution which prevents repeated queries from a single IP is not enough, and in fact does not
guarantee security against even completely asynchronous adversaries. This highlights the importance of password selection, as
increasing the guesswork is the key to a secure password-based system.
The insights from these randomized strategies also applies to a single attacker who attempts to breach a system which is
likely to be attacked by many other sources of attack. Against such as system, the attacker’s strategy is analogous to one of a
bot in a botnet. Indeed, since the system is likely to have been targeted by other attacks, the attacker might not want to follow
his list in a deterministic way as to avoid repeating guesses from the other attackers. Using a randomized strategy does not
hurt the performance asymptotically, but can prevent these repeated guesses.
A natural next step is to consider a distributed brute-force attack which aim at breaching any of V password-secured
accounts, rather than being aimed towards a single account. In this case, the computational effort will depend on the number
of accounts which are under attack. More precisely, a brute-force attack directed against the accounts of V members might be
deemed successful as soon as U of those accounts are compromised for U ≤ V , regardless of which U are compromised. The
case where U = 1 corresponds to a classical brute-force attack directed at a multi-user system, while letting U ≥ 2 models
attacks on some distributed storage system, in which, because of the redundancy, some but not all of the servers should be
compromised to access content. Additionally, once a system is compromised through sufficently many accounts, it may be
much harder to reliably detect or counteract the actions of the attacker, .e.g., in the case of a Byzantine attack (c.f. [30] or
[31]). Generalizations of the standard Guesswork problem to this setting have been studied (see [16]), and establish the gain
that arises from considering more accounts, especially when U is much smaller than V . However, the optimal strategies in this
case rely on a round-robin approach — assuming the password generation process for all users is identical. More precisely,
one should make password guesses to each account in turns, first making a guess for the first account, then the second, and
so-on, until eventually successfully guessing the passwords of U of the V accounts. Generalizing such attacks to a distributed
asynchronous case is of interest, and the subject of some future work.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL LEMMAS
The following lemma relate the position of a sequence xn in the optimal list, with the type of that sequence.
Lemma 3 Let xn be a i.i.d. generated sequence ,and consider the position of xn in the optimal list according to PX , i.e.
G∗(x). For a given α, we have that G∗(x) < d|X |αe if and only if the sequence x satisfy Pˆx ∈ Q(α), where
Q(α) = {QX : D(QX‖PX) +H(QX) < D(Q∗X‖PX) +H(Q∗X)} , (A.1)
with Q∗X being the solution of the optimization problem:
minimize
QX
D(QX‖PX) +H(QX)
subject to H(QX) ≥ α
. (A.2)
Proof 7 Recall that PX(x) = exp{−n
(
D(Pˆx‖PX) +H(Pˆx)
)
}, and that the size of the type set T (Pˆx) .= 2nH(Pˆx). Let Q(α)
be the set of types of the sequences that are in the first Xnα position in the list optimal list. Then, by definition of Q(α):∑
QX∈Q(α)
2nH(QX)
.
= 2nα (A.3)
An application of the method of types gives that the left-hand side evaluates to 2n supQX∈Q(α)H(QX), meaning that
supQX∈Q(α)H(QX) = α. Thus, the threshold probability is given by the type that solves (A.2), and any type that has
lower probability must appears before in the list.
